New Wrinkle on Fair Use, Just Last Week

Army vet wins contest to sculpt the Korean War memorial now installed in Washington, D.C. Then a retired Marine takes a photo of it. The Post Office pays $1,500 for the rights to make a stamp from the photo. Note that the government contract with the sculptor kept the IP rights with him. The Court of Federal Claims ruled that the P.O.’s stamp fell under fair use, so there was no claim by the sculptor. But the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled just last week that the photo was not transformative (the lower court had already dismissed other claims, including that the memorial was architecture, and that the sculptor wasn’t the sole creator).

So, a blow against fair use? Or getting earned money to an old vet?

The ACTA Threat

By Yoshang Cheng, David Rolnitzky, Lee Schneider, Jessica Voytek,

A coalition of governments are secretly meeting in an attempt to form a far-reaching agreement over copyright infringement.  The secret agreement, called the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), would establish international standards on intellectual property rights enforcement throughout such participating countries as the US, Canada and several members of the EU.  The agreement will formalize a process for finding 3rd parties liable for the infringements of their subscribers, and limiting their liability if they remove the content.  Although the actual wording of this agreement has not been officially published, reliable sources report that these negotiations are occurring behind closed doors, without public input.  The agreement is being structured similarly to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), except it will create rules and regulations regarding private copying and copyright laws.  Recently a document containing the ACTA provisions related to the Internet was leaked, which has spurred more discussion.

The ACTA has come under fire from a number of organizations, including the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge, claiming that ACTA has several potentially serious concerns for consumers’ privacy, civil liberties, innovation and the free flow of information on the Internet, and the sovereignty of developing nations.  Increased liability for ISPs (Internet Service Providers) could result in increased monitoring of users, which could then impede their civil rights. Although developing nations have not been involved with negotiations, chances are that their compliance with the regulations will be required as a condition of future trade agreements, effectively limiting the ability for developing countries to choose policy options best suited to their countries.

The effect of this secret agreement on ISP’s could be far-reaching.  These new provisions would require ISPs to take down possibly infringing content, as well as delete the accounts and subscriptions of users who are accused without any judicial oversight.  As a result, the so-called “chilling effect” documented by Urban and Quilter in their 2005 study could be expanded on a global-scale.  The chilling effect is a term that describes the practice of using DMCA takedown notices to improperly limit the speech of others, usually for commercial or political gain.  According to the study, an astonishing 57% of DMCA take down notices sent to Google were targeting apparent competitors. ISPs, fearing liability from this new international coalition, would be compelled to comply with these notices without any kind of judicial oversight.

Civil rights, including freedom of expression may be impacted by this agreement.  In the US, the fair use doctrine was adopted in order to mitigate the tension between freedom of expression and copyright restrictions on expression.  Fair use is not a standard component of copyright law in every country.  In a society without fair use, unauthorized use would be infringement.  “If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas what would they look like? This is pretty close,” said David Fewer, staff counsel at the University of Ottawa’s Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, in an article posted on Canada.com. Therefore this legislation would unduly benefit corporations at the expense of civil liberties.

The implementation of these new rules raises civil rights concerns.  For example, media outlets in Ireland and Canada have proposed scenarios in which people would be searched at international borders by security-turned-copyright-enforcer.  Such search and potential seizure of any items that “infringes” on copyright laws, such as ripped CD’s and movies, could be done without probable cause.

The impact of the agreement also has some potential consequences for policy in countries both within and outside the countries negotiating the ACTA.  As stated earlier, the agreement has a provision to create a legal regime to “encourage ISP’s to cooperate with right holders in the removal of infringing material” by giving them safe harbor from certain legal threats.  Though the US already has a “takedown notice” provision, the agreement could provide other coalition governments with new leeway to by-pass the normal legislative process in their countries in order to get DMCA-like legislation on the books.  Furthermore, tying such legislation to foreign treaties may constrain Congress’s ability to modify the DMCA in the future.

National sovereignty may also be impacted by ratification of this agreement.  Developing nations (such as China, India and Indonesia) have not been included in the negotiations but may still be required (indirectly) to comply with them.  Since the developing nations rely on international trade agreements for their well being, it would be easy for the ACTA nations to require compliance as a prerequisite to trade.  These laws would then supercede the ability for these developing nations to create laws for their countries.

The effects of ratifying ACTA in its current state would be far-reaching.  The applications of DMCA laws in the US, specifically the safe harbor provisions and take down notice process, are easily manipulated for commercial or political gain.  The rights of corporations are placed above the rights of citizens, and the process of law is turned on its head.  Accusation is proof enough to force action to remove the offending content.  The agreement would restrict the choices available to agreeing nations and developing nations alike. With so much at stake concerning the rights of individuals and the implications for international policies, it is troubling that these negotiations are being conducted secretly.

Do Not Call/No Trespassing

After reading the OPG v. Diebold case, I couldn’t help feeling bad for the poor Diebold employees whose home addresses and cell phone numbers were published in that email archive.  If publishing the archive falls under the fair use doctrine, does that mean that there is no issue with publishing their personal contact information also?  Or is that information considered factual, something that can be discovered?  Is a cell phone number considered private information?  What if a reader of the archive uses those home addresses to find and harass the employee(s)?  Is there any remediation is available to those Diebold employees??  This just seemed like an interesting intersection of Fair Use, Facts, and Privacy to me.

Do First, Ask Later: Copyright, Norms and Expectations

by Alison Meier, Kate Smith, Joan Ekaterin, and Jess Hemerly

Do First, Ask Later: Remix Culture and the “Gray Area”
Web 2.0 culture is driven by community-created content, information sharing, and yes, copyright infringement. Blogs repost photos from newspapers, magazines, and other blog posts, often with attribution but rarely with permission. YouTube is overflowing with unlicensed television clips and videos with unauthorized background music; some of these uses are infringing and are others within the scope of fair use (e.g., Lenz v. Universal, which we’ll read later this semester). While some Web 2.0 use has been found infringing by courts, like music file sharing (see A&M v. Napster), most falls in uncharted legal territory. Users creating content often takes the approach of do first, ask later. (more…)

206 examples

I was talking to Nat last week, and it turns out that he was having some fun last semester – some of his examples in 206 were pulled directly from the 205 readings. And just in case you were as ignorant of this as I was, here’s what he did…

First, he explained how to scrape data from the Rural Telephone Company website. From his description:

Reverse Phonebook Lookups against the ‘dark web’ Using Mechanize

Let’s say you’re publishing a phone book for Utah and you have a list of people’s names that live in Northwestern Utah and want to find everyone’s street address.

After a search, you find an html form from a phone company out there, that happens to be called Rural Telephone Company. You also notice they happen to have a handy web-based form on their site…

And then he explained how to scrape the “hot news” from the AP site.

Scraping Associated Press RSS Feeds with Universal Feed Parser
Let’s say you want to scrape news from an Associated Press site so you can appropriate their hot news and post it on your website.

We can assume no liability for your installations…

“This video contains content from Viacom…”

I know we are pretty far from DMCA safe harbors syllabus-wise, but I just went to watch a Colbert Report clip on YouTube and saw a message that I hadn’t noticed before on some copyrighted content. Instead of (roughly), “This video has been removed due to copyright infringement,” the message on the Colbert vid page read, “This video contains content from Viacom, who has decided to block it.” (more…)

PhoneBook readings

I thought these readings were quite interesting and I wonder how far people have gone in ripping facts from other sources. Could I buy an encyclopedia, rip all the facts from it and post them online for free? At first when reading Feist v. Rural, I was on the side of Rural, until I realized that they were trying to monopolize yellow page services. Yet I feel like the ProCD v. Zeidenberg seemed overboard, I could not imagine ProCD feeling happy to let users take the information it worked to aggregate. Has there been any replacement for the ‘Sweat of the Brow’ that was struck down by Feist v. Rural?

Facts and Facebook

by Sean Marimpietri, Ian McDowell, and Julian Nunez

This week’s readings focused on the distinction between facts and creative works and explored the legal implications of using facts without consent. In this post, we will explore the application of these principles to current developments in the realm of social networking, taking Facebook as our subject.

Control of Content

The internet makes the once onerous process of content creation and distribution significantly easier. Popular blogging platforms like Blogger and WordPress make it easy for users to create content and make it available to anyone in the world. Social networks like Facebook and “microblogging” services like Twitter make it trivial for individuals to express themselves with minimal effort.

Presumably, much of the original work a user produces through their use of a social networking site or blogging platform are copyright by the user; the Berne Convention (to which the US subscribes) dictates that copyright is automatic when a work becomes “fixed in some material form,” of which an electronic medium seems to apply. Though the average Facebook user may never reflect on the legal ownership of the things they post on their “Wall,” the law suggests that they do in fact own the copyright to any such posts that would be considered authored by the user.

Services like Facebook have Terms of Service (TOS) that require users to grant them a license to reproduce the copyright work you post on those sites; they would not be able to function without some such license. The judgement in ProCD v Zeidenberg established that the “click to accept” license model is binding:

A buyer accepts goods under sec. 2-606(1)(b) when, after an opportunity to inspect, he fails to make an effective rejection under sec. 2-602(1). ProCD extended an opportunity to reject if a buyer should find the license terms unsatisfactory

As in the ProCD case, Facebook users are presented with terms of service which they must accept before using the product. Presumably, this means the Facebook TOS is legally sound. For our discussion, the section of this TOS relating to copyright content reads:

For content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like photos and videos (“IP content”), you specifically give us the following permission, subject to your privacy and application settings: you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook (“IP License”). This IP License ends when you delete your IP content or your account unless your content has been shared with others, and they have not deleted it.

There are a couple of interesting points to unpack from this statement:

1) When you post something on Facebook, you grant Facebook permission to use it however they like, and you allow them to give that same permission to anyone else, at their discretion.

2) You can (and likely do) effectively lose control over a lot of your content once you share it with others. This is still better than the change to the TOS Facebook proposed in February of last year, which effectively would have had you granting them a license in perpetuity

3) The first clause makes the distinction between “IP content” and other content. In effect they are asserting that some of the information you post is not going to be covered by copyright. Exposition in Feist v. Rural gives us some idea of what these items might be; namely: facts. According to the case, “facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship, they are not original, and thus are not copyrightable.” The Facebook policy page on privacy helps to connect the dots:

Certain categories of information such as your name, profile photo, list of friends and pages you are a fan of, gender, geographic region, and networks you belong to are considered publicly available, and therefore do not have privacy settings.

Facebook has explicitly designated some of your content as being outside of your control, and presumably outside of your copyright. The term “publicly available” seems to be Facebook’s analog of what the cases we read labeled “facts.”

Facebook’s Use of Facts

Despite the present wide familiarity with Facebook, for the purpose of our conversation it could be useful to take a step back and have a fresh look at this free, web-based service. There are a few different categories of facts users disclose in the course of using Facebook. First, there is the required registration data, which includes name, email, gender and birth date. Second, users may optionally turn over additional personal information, such as previous schools attended, employers, relationship status and more.

In addition to these two categories, one could look at the types of facts at play from the language of Facebook’s own policy. As mentioned in the previous section, Facebook treats some of the information a user turns over as not constituting “IP content” and thus not covered by copyright. Going by the definition of facts presented in Feist v. Rural, we would assume that such content does not owe its origin to an act of authorship and would not be considered a creative work.

However, in Facebook’s privacy policy it is indicated that Facebook considers a user’s profile photos to be in a category of information that is “publicly available.” Yet the terms of service explicitly call out “photos” as falling under the heading of IP content. Their treatment then is inconsistent; they are either not giving users the promised control over their intellectual property, or they are making the argument that profile pictures are a special class of pictures that are not subject to copyright. How does it make sense for Facebook to consider a user’s profile photos to be of one category of information and an uploaded photo album to be of another? In what ways are Facebook’s categories of information that is “IP content” and information that is “publicly available” irreconcilable?

There are several cases one can think of where this discrepancy doesn’t make sense. A carefully composed profile photo of artistic value would seem like a natural fit for copyright protection. Similarly, some users upload profile photos with such a frequency that the collection of all their profile photos as a whole would could function as a photographic-documentary account of their lives over the years. In both cases, would it not make more sense for a user’s profile photos to be considered “IP content”?

There are other corners of Facebook where the copyright question comes into play. Facebook affords users the ability to make short text updates that answer the question: “What’s on your mind?” These “status updates” serve as a prime example of text that could alternately be considered fact or fiction. An update such as “Bob is at the zoo” seem unambiguously factual, while updates such as “This poem’s for my mom / I like her a lot / she’s better than Tom” would seem to meet the criteria for “authorship.” One can easily imagine other hybrid examples that might be subject to copyright as a whole, yet contain facts that are not subject to copyright, much in the manner of a telephone book. Facebook’s stance on how they are able to use such work is not explicit, and it is unclear what rights they claim to the use of information found in updates.

Privacy Implications

Given that at least some of the information Facebook users turn over is treated as “factual” and distributed widely and without restriction, it is clear that users do not have a high degree of control over all the data they provide. What do these two conditions imply from the perspective of users’ privacy?

People willingly provide information to Facebook for different purposes. They share some facts with the world in order to be easily contacted by their friends (such as name, email, school, and hometown). Also, they post information just to be shared with their friends (pictures, videos, status updates, relationship status, and so on). Finally, some users also provide information to be rewarded or publicly recognized (i.e. cities I’ve visited, Farmville, and different games). They willingly provide this information for a specific purpose and share it with a particular audience. Nevertheless, this information is not protected from other uses and could produce unintended results when aggregated or data-mined.

Public information on Facebook or other sites could be used as a source of privacy invasion. Some Facebook users have already been affected by facts and data shared in social networks. For example, persons having affairs or flirting on the web have been detected by their partners . Data from social networks has been used as evidence in divorce cases and job dismissals. Also, some companies and individuals have developed methods and techniques to use information from social networks such as Facebook to detect patterns of behavior. These methods are used to determine someone’s sexual orientation or cheating behavior.

What kind of protection exists against these privacy issues? Apparently, not much. According to Facebook policy:

[Facebook] cannot control the actions of other users with whom you share your information. We cannot guarantee that only authorized persons will view your information. We cannot ensure that information you share on Facebook will not become publicly available. We are not responsible for third party circumvention of any privacy settings or security measures on Facebook.

Also, as noted in this post, users do not have many judicial means to prevent this type of actions. Facts are not subject to copyright and users are limited by the TOS of a website once they click “I Accept”.

Moreover, even users who do not willingly provide information or who do not sign up to any website and accept their terms are still subject to privacy invasion. After the Boring case, facts such as addresses and images of a house are considered public domain. Companies such as Google, Facebook or individuals could aggregate this data for their particular interests. After all, even Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg has suffered from an invasion of privacy.

Facebook is just one example showing the changes in the scope of information people disclose and the manner in which they create works. At the same time, the methods of aggregating and processing disclosed data are growing more powerful. The intersection of these trends portends serious ramifications with respect to privacy and copyright. While the legal cases we covered certainly suggest how existing law might be extended to cover these changes, it may be that more specific laws (or new rulings) are needed to establish healthy legal norms for internet services.

From Feist v. Rural

Just as I was remarking to someone that SCOTUS decisions were so much easier to read than most legal papers, I run across this: “Section 3 was similarly ambiguous. It stated that the copyright in a work protected only “the copyrightable component parts of the work.””

That does seem rather circular, doesn’t it? It would be a stretch for copyright law to cover the non-copyrightable portions of a work.

Open Access & Network Neutrality

Deirdre briefly touched on the idea of Open Access towards the end of the lecture on Monday and it may be something that many of you are interested in.  Network Neutrality is a related topic that may also be of interest.  Unfortunately, due to the shortened semester, we probably won’t give these topics the attention they deserve.  I’ve gone ahead and listed the Network Neutrality readings from last year just in case you can’t stand the thought of missing out on them.

You may also want to follow this discussion and others at the FCC.

So what do you all think?  Is Open Access and Network Neutrality possible given the current state of affairs?  What are the risks? If you’ve got any thoughts or opinions on these topics, or if you’d like to refer us to additional resources, please do share.

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