Court Rules LimeWire Infringed on Copyrights

http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/05/limewireruling.pdf

The court ruled that LimeWire intended to “induce infringement” because:

(1) The massive scale of infringement committed by LimeWire users

(2) LimeWire knew about the massive scale of infringing users on their network

One item that was interesting to me was that the court determined that LimeWire’s response to the massive scale of infringement to be insufficient. There were company papers acknowledging the mass infringement, but also strategic plan to convert infringing users to customers of LimeWire’s online store (which would sell authorized music). It seems interesting to me that the strategic plan for conversion did not protect LimeWire and the court implies that knowledge of infringement along with insufficient response may place companies liable for infringement of copyright.

Additionally, the court ruled that LimeWire’s advertisement campaigns incited copyright infringement. However I think that these ad campaigns were very different than the slogans used by Grokster and Napster. In the previous cases, advertisements explicitly stated the copyrighted materials that could be downloaded (ie: the top 10 songs on the network etc). However, in the case of LimeWire, campaigns were designed to advertise the technical functionality of the application: “free music downloads”, “excellent for downloading music files”. Where the company faltered was in associating themselves with other infringement fostering programs (Napster, Morpheus, etc), however the there were explicit advertisements marketing LimeWire as a way to obtain copyrightable material for free. This is interesting because it is placing more pressure on companies: marketing of their products could be used against them if  interpreted as promoting illegal activities.

Derived – Copied – Inspired ………

itwofs.com – chronicles of plagiarism in Indian music, is a popular website among Indian film music aficionados. At times, the author of the website accuses and mocks music directors for blatantly copying and at other times the same author appreciates a music director for being inspired by some music, listen to the samples here – as a bonus you get introduced to Indian film music! What really interests me is how he makes this decision, I have to admit that there are times when it is blatantly clear, at least to me, that a particular work is copied or inspired, but I find it difficult to put this natural cognitive decision on whether something is inspired or copied into a set of rules, so as to make a law out of it.

In this blog post, inspired by this website and the recent surge in patent suits concerning smart phones, I look at the concept of “derivative work and copyright”, first from a musician’s point of view by considering two musical examples and then applying it into what might turn out to be a frivolous patent suit filed by Apple against HTC.

In 17 U.S.C. § 101, “derivative work” is defined as:

A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”.

From Feist vs Rural, we understood that a derivative work must show some originality to not have violated copyright.

According to the derivative work definition, a musical work that is based upon a pre-existing musical arrangement is a derivative work. Suppose, if I take the famous song “My Heart Will Go On” from the movie Titanic and remove Celine Deon’s voice and replace it with another singer’s voice and sell it in a local musical market in India – such things happen by the way, then I have obviously derived from the original work and have blatantly violated copyrights.

However, things get slightly murkier if I put a North African Kora in place of Celine Deon’s voice, is it derivative ? according to the definition it is, but as a composer I might feel that it is my creative genius that lead me to associate a relatively unheard of instrument like the Kora (btw, it does sound great !) within a completely different context. Therefore, It could be argued that though I derived, I didn’t violate copyright(or did I ??). But from a musician’s point of view, especially James Horner the composer who composed this song, this sounds absurd as the melody, harmony and so on are all the same, just that the timbre has changed.

Sidetracking, suppose if I build a touch interface which can differentiate between a single finger touch and a two fingers touch and use it to build a drawing instrument, have I violated Apple’s patent ? Apple has sued HTC for something similar, but drawing parallels with the above mentioned musical example, can it be argued that though I derived, I was creative in using the touch interface for something different ? like how I used the Kora ? will Steve Jobs be happy ???

Big Content doesn’t like proposed amendments to Indian Copyright Law

The last major revision to Indian Copyright Law was in 1957. It has seen a number of amendments since, the last one  in 1999. These laws have not kept up with the changing nature of the role of technology in the distribution of copyrighted material. India recently proposed amendments (pdf) to the law to address these changes and to bring Indian Copyright Law into compliance with the WIPO Internet Treaties (pdf).

As discussed in this article at Ars Technica, the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), representing Big Content in the US (MPAA, RIAA etc.) is not happy with the proposed amendments. Their main complaint is about India’s take on the DRM anticircumvention provisions. The amendment allows the circumvention of DRM if the intended use is not infringing. For example, end users can rip a DRM protected DVD for personal use without breaking the law. While this seems to be fair and is in complicance with the WIPO Internet Treaties, the DMCA, an equivalent law in the US holds that circumventing DRM for any use is illegal. Clearly, it serves the purposes of Big Content well. Under the Indian version of the law, the onus would be on copyright holders to determine if a circumvention was an infringement.

My main take away was the influence Big Content has on government policy in the US. Apart from laws like the DMCA, parts of which go overboard in their attempt to protect the interests of copyright holders, they also heavily influence creation of the “Priority Watch List” of the US which includes India, China and even Canada. Formulating unbiased policy is a real challenge and I’m glad India got it right in this case.

Apple, Secrecy, and Paranoia

While we’re on the subject of trade secrets and paranoia, last week, Gizmodo got its hands on a prototype of the new iPhone, allegedly left in a Redwood City bar, picked up by someone, and sold to Gizmodo for $5,000. A criminal investigation is now under way not about trade secrets, but whether or not Gizmodo’s acquisition of the phone amounts to theft. It’s like a trade secret case on steroids. CNET reports that a San Mateo judge granted California’s Rapid Enforcement Allied Computer Team (REACT) a warrant to raid Gizmodo editor Jason Chen’s house and seize “four computers and two servers.” I know this is a bit outside of the scope of this class’s readings, but the most interesting part of this will be around First Amendment protection of online journalism. According to CNET, “Any prosecution would be complicated because of the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press: the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2001 that confidential information leaked to a news organization could be legally broadcast, although that case did not deal with physical property and the radio station did not pay its source.”

Note to YouTube: Don’t use email to ask your co-founder to stop uploading copyrighted videos

Viacom is suing YouTube (therefore, Google) for 1 billion dollars for copyright infringement. The lawsuit has been going on for 3 years, but the many of the legal briefs and exhibits were just made public today, in particular internal emails.

Viacom argues that YouTube intentionally posted copyrighted content in order to increase the size of their audience. Google defends its actions that they have complied with DMCA by removing copyrighted content as soon as they are alerted of its presence. They have also built in a system for flagging copyrighted material. More recently they have created a filtering system called Content ID that automatically compares uploaded materials with copyrighted works in its library. Viacom is trying to prove that even though they created measures for removing copyrighted works, YouTube was actually encouraging copyright violations.

Viacom alleges not only that Google is guilty of secondary liability but of also posting copyrighted content intentionally. Like in MGM v. Grokster, internal company materials are being used as evidence to demonstrate that YouTube was not a passive infringer. They cite an email from one YouTube founder to another that essentially asks him to stop posting copyrighted videos because it will look bad when they are claiming that they are trying to minimize infringement: “Jawed, please stop putting stolen videos on the site. We’re going to have a tough time defending the fact that we’re not liable for the copyrighted material on the site because we didn’t put it up when one of the co-founders is blatantly stealing content from other sites and trying to get everyone to see it.”

YouTube, in turn, accuses Viacom of putting its own copyrighted materials on the site in order to gain publicity. If YouTube can prove that Viacom intentionally put their own materials on the site, it will be interesting to see if the court will consider this an implicit license for copyrighted material.

Facts and Facebook

by Sean Marimpietri, Ian McDowell, and Julian Nunez

This week’s readings focused on the distinction between facts and creative works and explored the legal implications of using facts without consent. In this post, we will explore the application of these principles to current developments in the realm of social networking, taking Facebook as our subject.

Control of Content

The internet makes the once onerous process of content creation and distribution significantly easier. Popular blogging platforms like Blogger and WordPress make it easy for users to create content and make it available to anyone in the world. Social networks like Facebook and “microblogging” services like Twitter make it trivial for individuals to express themselves with minimal effort.

Presumably, much of the original work a user produces through their use of a social networking site or blogging platform are copyright by the user; the Berne Convention (to which the US subscribes) dictates that copyright is automatic when a work becomes “fixed in some material form,” of which an electronic medium seems to apply. Though the average Facebook user may never reflect on the legal ownership of the things they post on their “Wall,” the law suggests that they do in fact own the copyright to any such posts that would be considered authored by the user.

Services like Facebook have Terms of Service (TOS) that require users to grant them a license to reproduce the copyright work you post on those sites; they would not be able to function without some such license. The judgement in ProCD v Zeidenberg established that the “click to accept” license model is binding:

A buyer accepts goods under sec. 2-606(1)(b) when, after an opportunity to inspect, he fails to make an effective rejection under sec. 2-602(1). ProCD extended an opportunity to reject if a buyer should find the license terms unsatisfactory

As in the ProCD case, Facebook users are presented with terms of service which they must accept before using the product. Presumably, this means the Facebook TOS is legally sound. For our discussion, the section of this TOS relating to copyright content reads:

For content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like photos and videos (“IP content”), you specifically give us the following permission, subject to your privacy and application settings: you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook (“IP License”). This IP License ends when you delete your IP content or your account unless your content has been shared with others, and they have not deleted it.

There are a couple of interesting points to unpack from this statement:

1) When you post something on Facebook, you grant Facebook permission to use it however they like, and you allow them to give that same permission to anyone else, at their discretion.

2) You can (and likely do) effectively lose control over a lot of your content once you share it with others. This is still better than the change to the TOS Facebook proposed in February of last year, which effectively would have had you granting them a license in perpetuity

3) The first clause makes the distinction between “IP content” and other content. In effect they are asserting that some of the information you post is not going to be covered by copyright. Exposition in Feist v. Rural gives us some idea of what these items might be; namely: facts. According to the case, “facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship, they are not original, and thus are not copyrightable.” The Facebook policy page on privacy helps to connect the dots:

Certain categories of information such as your name, profile photo, list of friends and pages you are a fan of, gender, geographic region, and networks you belong to are considered publicly available, and therefore do not have privacy settings.

Facebook has explicitly designated some of your content as being outside of your control, and presumably outside of your copyright. The term “publicly available” seems to be Facebook’s analog of what the cases we read labeled “facts.”

Facebook’s Use of Facts

Despite the present wide familiarity with Facebook, for the purpose of our conversation it could be useful to take a step back and have a fresh look at this free, web-based service. There are a few different categories of facts users disclose in the course of using Facebook. First, there is the required registration data, which includes name, email, gender and birth date. Second, users may optionally turn over additional personal information, such as previous schools attended, employers, relationship status and more.

In addition to these two categories, one could look at the types of facts at play from the language of Facebook’s own policy. As mentioned in the previous section, Facebook treats some of the information a user turns over as not constituting “IP content” and thus not covered by copyright. Going by the definition of facts presented in Feist v. Rural, we would assume that such content does not owe its origin to an act of authorship and would not be considered a creative work.

However, in Facebook’s privacy policy it is indicated that Facebook considers a user’s profile photos to be in a category of information that is “publicly available.” Yet the terms of service explicitly call out “photos” as falling under the heading of IP content. Their treatment then is inconsistent; they are either not giving users the promised control over their intellectual property, or they are making the argument that profile pictures are a special class of pictures that are not subject to copyright. How does it make sense for Facebook to consider a user’s profile photos to be of one category of information and an uploaded photo album to be of another? In what ways are Facebook’s categories of information that is “IP content” and information that is “publicly available” irreconcilable?

There are several cases one can think of where this discrepancy doesn’t make sense. A carefully composed profile photo of artistic value would seem like a natural fit for copyright protection. Similarly, some users upload profile photos with such a frequency that the collection of all their profile photos as a whole would could function as a photographic-documentary account of their lives over the years. In both cases, would it not make more sense for a user’s profile photos to be considered “IP content”?

There are other corners of Facebook where the copyright question comes into play. Facebook affords users the ability to make short text updates that answer the question: “What’s on your mind?” These “status updates” serve as a prime example of text that could alternately be considered fact or fiction. An update such as “Bob is at the zoo” seem unambiguously factual, while updates such as “This poem’s for my mom / I like her a lot / she’s better than Tom” would seem to meet the criteria for “authorship.” One can easily imagine other hybrid examples that might be subject to copyright as a whole, yet contain facts that are not subject to copyright, much in the manner of a telephone book. Facebook’s stance on how they are able to use such work is not explicit, and it is unclear what rights they claim to the use of information found in updates.

Privacy Implications

Given that at least some of the information Facebook users turn over is treated as “factual” and distributed widely and without restriction, it is clear that users do not have a high degree of control over all the data they provide. What do these two conditions imply from the perspective of users’ privacy?

People willingly provide information to Facebook for different purposes. They share some facts with the world in order to be easily contacted by their friends (such as name, email, school, and hometown). Also, they post information just to be shared with their friends (pictures, videos, status updates, relationship status, and so on). Finally, some users also provide information to be rewarded or publicly recognized (i.e. cities I’ve visited, Farmville, and different games). They willingly provide this information for a specific purpose and share it with a particular audience. Nevertheless, this information is not protected from other uses and could produce unintended results when aggregated or data-mined.

Public information on Facebook or other sites could be used as a source of privacy invasion. Some Facebook users have already been affected by facts and data shared in social networks. For example, persons having affairs or flirting on the web have been detected by their partners . Data from social networks has been used as evidence in divorce cases and job dismissals. Also, some companies and individuals have developed methods and techniques to use information from social networks such as Facebook to detect patterns of behavior. These methods are used to determine someone’s sexual orientation or cheating behavior.

What kind of protection exists against these privacy issues? Apparently, not much. According to Facebook policy:

[Facebook] cannot control the actions of other users with whom you share your information. We cannot guarantee that only authorized persons will view your information. We cannot ensure that information you share on Facebook will not become publicly available. We are not responsible for third party circumvention of any privacy settings or security measures on Facebook.

Also, as noted in this post, users do not have many judicial means to prevent this type of actions. Facts are not subject to copyright and users are limited by the TOS of a website once they click “I Accept”.

Moreover, even users who do not willingly provide information or who do not sign up to any website and accept their terms are still subject to privacy invasion. After the Boring case, facts such as addresses and images of a house are considered public domain. Companies such as Google, Facebook or individuals could aggregate this data for their particular interests. After all, even Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg has suffered from an invasion of privacy.

Facebook is just one example showing the changes in the scope of information people disclose and the manner in which they create works. At the same time, the methods of aggregating and processing disclosed data are growing more powerful. The intersection of these trends portends serious ramifications with respect to privacy and copyright. While the legal cases we covered certainly suggest how existing law might be extended to cover these changes, it may be that more specific laws (or new rulings) are needed to establish healthy legal norms for internet services.