Is consumer’s privacy protected by consumer protection policies?

Alex Kantchelian, Dhawal Mujumdar & Sean Carey

FTC Policies on Deception and Unfairness

These two papers outline the FTC’s policies on cracking down on consumer unfairness and deception. The FTC policies are defined from several court cases that influenced consumer protection. However, no single statement on consumer unfairness and deception had been issued up to that point by the FTC.


The FTC policy statement on Unfairness


The FTC is responding to a letter by Senators Danforth and Ford, concerning one aspect of the FTC’s jurisdiction over “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” The senate subcommittee is planning to hold hearings on the concept of “unfairness” as applied to consumer transactions

The FTC states that the concept of consumer unfairness is not immediately obvious and this uncertainty is troublesome for some business and members of the legal profession. They attempt to delineate a concrete framework for future application of the FTC’s unfairness authority. However, from court rulings, the FTC has boiled down unfair acts or practices in affecting commerce into three categories: consumer injury, violating established public policy, or it is unethical or unscrupulous.

Consumer Injury

The commission is concerned with substantive harms, such as monetary harm and unwarranted health and safety risks. Emotional effects tend to not ‘make the cut’ as evidence of injury. The injury must not be outweighed by any offsetting of the consumer or competitive benefits that the sales practices also produces, i.e. the item producer can justify not informing the consumer if it saves the consumer money. However, if sellers adopt a number of practices that unjustifiably hinder free market decisions, it can be considered unfair. This includes over coercion, or exercising undue influence over highly susceptible purchasers.

Violation of public policy

Violation of public policy is used by the FTC as a means of providing additional evidence on the degree of consumer injury caused by specific practices. The S&H court considered it as a separate consideration. The FTC thinks its important to examine outside statutory policies and established judicial principles for assistance in helping the agency

Unethical or unscrupulous conduct

Unethical or unscrupulous conduct is used for certainty in reaching all the purposes of the underlying statue that forbids “Unfair” acts or practices. The FTC has decided that though this is largely duplicative, because truly unethical or unscrupulous conduct will almost always injure customers or violate public policy as well.

Summary of FTC policy statement on deception

Section 5 of the FTC act declares unfair or deceptive acts or practices unlawful. Section 12 specifically prohibits false ads. There is no single definitive statement of the Commission’s authority on deceptive acts.

Summary:

The FTC does not have any single, definitive statement of their authority on deceptive acts. However, they have an outline for the basis of a deception case: It must have misrepresentation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the customer, false oral or written representations, misleading price claims, sales of hazardous or systematically defective products or services without adequate disclosers or similar issues. Second, the FTC examines the practice from the perspective of a consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances and third, the FTC looks if the representation, omission or practice is a material one. Most deception involves written or oral misrepresentations, or omission of material information and generally occurs in other forms of conduct associated with a sales transaction. Advertisements will also be considered when dealing with a case of deception. The commission has also found deception where a sales representative misrepresented the purpose of the initial contact with customers.

Part 2, There Must be a Representation, Omission or Practice that is likely to mislead the consumer.

Most deception involves written or oral misrepresentation, or omissions of material information. The Commission looks for both expressed and implied claims, the latter determined through an examination of the representation itself. In some cases, consumers can be presumed to reach false beliefs about products or services because of omissions. The commission can sometimes reach these claims, but other times may require evidence of a consumers’ expectations.

Part 3, The act or practice must be considered from the perspective of the reasonable consumer.

Marketing and point-of-sales practices such as bait and switch cases that can mislead consumers are also deceptive. When a product is sold, there is an implied representation that the product is fit for the purpose for which it is sold, if not then it is considered deceptive. Additionally, the FTC will take special consideration to the needs of specific audiences, for example: vulnerable audiences such as the terminally ill, the elderly and young children. The FTC takes into consideration how the consumer will interpret claims by advertisements and written material. They will avoid cases with ‘obviously exaggerated or puffing representations’ that consumers would not take seriously. Also, the Commission notes that it sees little incentive to deceive consumers for products that are inexpensive or easy to evaluate such as consumables (toilet paper, soap, etc). The commission will look at the practice closely before issuing a complaint based on deception. The FTC takes into account the entire advertisement, transaction or course of dealing  and how the consumer is likely to respond. The FTC considers the entire “mosaic” in addition to materiality

Part 4, the representation, omission or practice must be material

The third major element that the FTC considers is the materiality of the representation. The FTC considers a “material” as information that affects the consumer’s choice or conduct. This “material” can be concern purpose, safety, efficacy, or cost. If the commission cannot find material evidence that there is deception, the commission will seek evidence that the omission of material is important to consumers.

Conclusion:

The Commission works to find acts or practices that it considers deceptive if there is a misrepresentation, omission or other such practices that could harm consumers. Although the commission does not require extrinsic material evidence, but in certain situations such evidence might be necessary.

Sears Holdings Management Corporation Case

Sometimes you wonder whether all these commissions like Federal Trade Commission are there for namesake only. But when you look at the recent case involving Sears Holdings Management Corporation, then you realize their importance. The principle mission of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is “consumer protection” and prevention of “anti-competitive” business practices. And in this case they precisely stick to their core mission and once again prove their worth.

Sears Holding Management Corporation (“respondent” or “SHMC”), a subsidiary of Sears Holding Corporation. SHMC  handles marketing operations for the Sears Roebuck and Kmart retail stores, and operates the sears.com and kmart.com retail internet websites.
From on or about April 2007 through January 2008, SHMC disseminated via the internet a software application for consumers to download and install onto their computers, This application was created, developed, and managed for SHMC by a third party in connection with SHMC’s “My SHC Community” market research program. The application, when installed, runs in background at all times on consumers’ computers and transmits tracked information, including nearly all of the internet behavior that occurs on those computers, to servers maintained on behalf of SHMC. Information collected and transmitted included all the web browsing, secure sessions, checking online accounts, and use of web-based email and instant messaging services.
If you are angered and aghast with the level of encroachment into the privacy of consumers then hold on to your seat, its just the beginning. SHMC didn’t mention all the details about their application and what it was going to collect in their “click-wrap” license or their privacy policies. Fifteen out of hundred visitors to sears.com and kmart.com websites presented with a “My SHC Community” pop-up box. This pop-up box mentioned the purpose and benefits joining of “My SHC Community”. But it made no mention of the software application (“the application”). Likewise, general “Privacy Policy” statement accessed via the hyperlink in the pop-up box did not mention the application. Furthermore, the pop-up box message invited consumers to enter their email address to receive a follow-up email from SHMC with more information. Subsequently, invitation messages were emailed to those consumers who supplied their email address. These invitation messages described what consumers would receive in exchange for becoming member of the “My SHC Community”. Consumers who wished to proceed were asked to click the “Join Today” button at the bottom of the message.
After clicking “Join Today” button in the email, consumers were directed to a landing page that restated many of the representations about the potential interactions between members and the “community”. However, landing page did not mention anything about the application. There was one more “Join Today” button on the landing page. Consumers who clicked on this button were directed to registration page. To complete the registration, consumers needed to enter their name, address, age, and email address. Below the fields of entering information, the registration page presented a “Privacy Statement and User License Agreement” (PSULA) in a scroll box that displayed ten lines of multi-page document at a time.
A description of the software application (that was going to get installed) begins on approximately the 75th line down in the scroll box. That means consumer had to navigate through seven pages to read this information. This description involved the information about internet usage. It also mentioned about various activities of it was going to monitor. Even though the PSULA had information about the activities it was going to monitor, it was still ambiguous about what this application was actually going to do. For example, it was mentioned that this application will monitor the collected information for better understanding of their consumers and their household but it didn’t mention what SMHC meant by monitoring. Was this monitoring done by automatic programs or someone manually? The PSULA did not mention about any specific information that was monitored. They also mentioned that their application might examine the header information of the instant/e-mail messages of their consumers. PSULA also described how the information that application would collect was transmitted to SHMC’s servers, how it might be used and how it was maintained. Lastly it clearly stated that PSULA reserved the right to continue to use information collected. At the end, it asked consumers to accept these terms and conditions and those who accepted these terms and conditions were directed to an installation page that explained downloading and installation instructions for the application. Installation page didn’t give any information about the application. When installed, the application worked and transmitted information substantially as described in PSULA.
The tracked information included not only information about websites consumers visited and links that they clicked but also text of secure pages, such as online banking statements, online drug prescription records, select header files that could show the sender, recipient, subject and size of web-based email messages etc.
We believe the level of encroachment into the privacy of consumers was not only blatant but also shocking. It failed to disclose adequately that the software application when installed would nearly monitor all the internet behavior and activities on the consumers computers. Thus, this failure to disclose various facts and information was nothing but deceptive practice as discussed in FTC’s policy about deception.

Understanding privacy under FTC and OECD consumer protection policies


Precisely and exhaustively defining the concept of privacy is a challenging problem. For starters, the Merriam-Webster defines one’s right to privacy as the “freedom from unauthorized intrusion”. How inclusive is this definition?
As suggested, we often contrast privacy with being spied on – someone collecting and possibly disclosing data about us, without our knowledge or consent. The FTC policy on unfairness would a priori seem naturally suited to the task. To be unfair, the privacy breach has to be a practice that injuries the consumer. Can we establish injury in a general privacy breach case? Unfortunately, the requirements do not look extremely promising. First, privacy breach must have substantial effect, namely lead to monetary or physical harm for the consumer: “more subjective types of harm are excluded” [FTC on unfairness]. There is usually no directly observable monetary or physical harm when a privacy breach occurs, with the exception of a few cases which tend to receive massive media-coverage, such as the murder of Rebecca Schaeffer, where a stalker obtained the actress home address through the California DMV records.  Second, the net value of the privacy breach has to be considered: possibly good outcomes balance the gravity of the injury. So, trading privacy in exchange of cash has good chances to actually play in your favor before the FTC committee (and your department store fidelity card does just that). Third, the privacy breach has to be unavoidable to the consumer. This obviously happens with an information hiding manufacturer [Sony BMG rootkit incident], but it does not need to be the case [Sears Holdings case] in order to result in a huge privacy disaster.
The FTC statement on unfairness is thus not so well suited for privacy protection purposes. What about the statement on deception? Oddly, it turns out that one can take the problem by a somewhat idiosyncratic angle: alleging misleading privacy expectations regarding a given product[Sears Holdings case]. What is surprising is the fact that privacy is treated as any other product feature, so that we are never really talking that much about privacy rather than misrepresenting and deceptive practices. Moreover, in the analysis of the likelihood of deception, one implicitly relies on unstated privacy expectations of reasonable consumers. The problem is that even reasonable consumers may not have enough technical knowledge to understand privacy issues in today’s highly complex world of softwares, so that the very foundations of reasonable expectations and the analysis of effects on the targeted audience are deeply weakened.
Privacy, understand as the right to be left alone is, at most, moderately well served by the FTC consumer protection policies. Unfortunately, in the information-intensive world, it also seems that a lot of “non-intrusive” data processing naturally falls into our understanding of privacy. For example, one’s ability to inspect her stored personal data on relevant systems, or one’s right to have her personal information data well secured from malevolent outsiders are pretty basic privacy requirements, which are not covered by our leading definition.
Interestingly, the OECD has pointed to some of those issues in its Guidelines on Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. In a tussle between free-flow of information which is economically benefic and privacy for the protection of the consumer, the OECD suggests 7 principles to be enforced by its members. Data collecting limitation, data quality for restraining data collection to only the relevant to the purpose it is been collected, purpose specification before the time of collection, security safeguards for protecting collected data, openness which is readily available purposes and nature of the collected data, individual participation for avoiding the tyranny of a blind administration, and finally accountability.
In France for instance, the CNIL (the National Commission of Computerized Systems and Liberties) implements these recommendations since 1978 (thus, ahead of OECD’s guidelines), albeit not without several criticisms, ranging from the quality of the decisions reached, decisions being often in favor of governmental actions, to its painfully long processes because of the overwhelming number of submitted requests and cases before this relatively small administrative organ.

Note to YouTube: Don’t use email to ask your co-founder to stop uploading copyrighted videos

Viacom is suing YouTube (therefore, Google) for 1 billion dollars for copyright infringement. The lawsuit has been going on for 3 years, but the many of the legal briefs and exhibits were just made public today, in particular internal emails.

Viacom argues that YouTube intentionally posted copyrighted content in order to increase the size of their audience. Google defends its actions that they have complied with DMCA by removing copyrighted content as soon as they are alerted of its presence. They have also built in a system for flagging copyrighted material. More recently they have created a filtering system called Content ID that automatically compares uploaded materials with copyrighted works in its library. Viacom is trying to prove that even though they created measures for removing copyrighted works, YouTube was actually encouraging copyright violations.

Viacom alleges not only that Google is guilty of secondary liability but of also posting copyrighted content intentionally. Like in MGM v. Grokster, internal company materials are being used as evidence to demonstrate that YouTube was not a passive infringer. They cite an email from one YouTube founder to another that essentially asks him to stop posting copyrighted videos because it will look bad when they are claiming that they are trying to minimize infringement: “Jawed, please stop putting stolen videos on the site. We’re going to have a tough time defending the fact that we’re not liable for the copyrighted material on the site because we didn’t put it up when one of the co-founders is blatantly stealing content from other sites and trying to get everyone to see it.”

YouTube, in turn, accuses Viacom of putting its own copyrighted materials on the site in order to gain publicity. If YouTube can prove that Viacom intentionally put their own materials on the site, it will be interesting to see if the court will consider this an implicit license for copyrighted material.

Twitter’s Geolocation Feature

There has been some news over the last few days about Twitter finally turning on its geolocation feature.  It allows you to see a map overlaying individual tweets together with place names and the location of the tweet. Though the feature has been live via the twitter API since last fall (so it’s not “breaking” news), this week it was finally turned on.  Facebook is also expected to turn on geolocation in the near future.  Though the Twitter service is opt-in (what a Google Buzz-like story it would have been otherwise!), and there are a number of really cool/useful things that twitter+location could bring (Another way for impromptu meetups with friends! Deals from the store on the corner!), some people (here, here, here are a few) are raising privacy concerns.  There aren’t any current tools for controlling who actually sees your location (uh oh), and scenarios like tweeting while you’re on vacation and getting burglarized , more tools for stalkers, employers going all big brother on their employees, etc. could happen.  Some food for thought as we talk more about technology and privacy issues in lecture.

If you build it, they could sue…

By Michael Chung, Marco Cozzi, Tanushree Jindal, Thejo Kote

In this class we study how the design of technology can introduce liability in the areas of copyright and privacy. We have tried to analyze the legal issues as they relate to contemporary topics.

Technology design liability as it relates to copyright

“From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment — the printing press — that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection.” (Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984))

This week’s cases examine the ongoing tussle between the contrasting values of supporting creativity through copyright protection and promoting technological innovation by limiting infringement liability. We attempt to look at the technological adaptations that have evolved in response to indirect liability suits, to allow infringement, and survey the current alternatives devised by copyright holders.

The Betamax case set a precedent by a decision that the manufacturers of home video recording devices are not liable for copyright infringement, so long as the technology is capable of substantial non-infringing uses. It also established a test for determining whether a manufacturer (or developer) of a device (or an application) with recording and copying capabilities was responsible for contributory or vicarious infringement.

Napster, a pioneering and extremely popular music file-sharing application, was shut down by court order for copyright violations in 2001 after operating for two years. Their solution was technically advanced – they also maintained an efficient, centralized search index to help facilitate a user to find a specific MP3 audio file and then enable downloading it from an another user or peer. The centralized index was key in Napster’s case as it proved that the company had “actual knowledge” of direct infringing activity by its users, was thereby in a position to act on it, and hence declared liable for contributory infringement.

In an attempt to woo Napster’s large user base, Grokster and StreamCast created file sharing applications that maintained a decentralized search index and ensured, through different techniques, that all “knowledge” of infringing activity was removed, and could be disclaimed. They too ran afoul of copyright infringement as it was proved that they distributed their applications with the clear intent of promoting its use to infringe copyright. The decision, however was not a straightforward one as it came before the Supreme Court after Grokster won in two lower courts. Apart from noting the intent to profit from copyright infringement, the Supreme court also failed to find substantial non-infringing uses of Grokster and StreamCast.

Over time, it has been challenging for the courts to determine if a technology is capable of substantial non-infringing uses, primarily because with every precedent that is set, technology evolves to work around what has been established to be an infringement. This evolution of the design of file sharing technology has manifested itself in the disaggregation of the discovery of content and the actual transport of bits between computers. After the Grokster ruling, the most popular mechanism of sharing files has been through the use of BitTorrent technology, which does not provide an easy opportunity for copyright holders to target individual providers with secondary liability suits.

BitTorrent is just a protocol for data transfer, which depends on torrent files for a download to be initiated, and tracking servers which act as pointers to where the actual data resides. Anybody can start a service which indexes torrent files and provides the tracking servers needed by BitTorrent, and many people have done so. Grokster worked around the centralized nature of Napster, but it was still a large entity which could be sued and held liable for indirect infringement. In the case of BitTorrent, that is much harder to do, since there are so many alternatives available to people. Of course, the copyright holders have tried to target tracker sites too – with the MPAA suing isoHunt, TorrentSpy and other services in 2006. But, technology has evolved yet again, with the use of decentralized trackers now becoming popular.

With each stage of evolution, the courts have found it more difficult to make the case that a technology is not capable of non-infringing uses. In Grokster’s case Justice Breyer argued for the potential non-infringing uses of technology and that limited legitimate use at any point in time may increase to something more if given an opportunity. As the disaggregation of services and their potential non-infringing uses increase, the courts may not be willing to take a hard stance against new technologies, even if they can be used for copyright infringement.

In light of the evolution of technology, copyright holders have also been adapting. There seems to have been a change in their understanding of the new reality. Services like Hulu, the iTunes Store and Netflix are major examples of this trend, which provide end users an option of obtaining the desired content easily, affordably and legally while at the same time meeting the goals of the copyright holders in realizing value from their content. The challenge for copyright holders may be in accepting the fact that technological innovation limits their ability to realize that value in the same magnitude as before. The tension between the rights of copyright holders and the need to support technological innovation is ongoing, with each adapting to challenges from the other.

Technology design liability as it relates to privacy

In designing technological tools, the cases we’ve read this week have outlined a number of criteria by which infringement of privacy could be argued. Here we will apply some of the privacy concepts to Chatroulette (http://www.chatroulette.com) and Chatroulette Map (http://www.chatroulettemap.com/), a recent service that compiles and displays Chatroulette users’ geographical location and images. Chatroulette is operated by Andrey Ternovskiy, a 17-year-old Russian highschool student (http://nyti.ms/9uLJYw) and hosted outside the United States. Chatroulette Map is operated by another party (besides Ternovskiy) and is hosted by Dreamhost in California. Taking into consideration, the technical designs of Chatroulette and Chatroulette Map, Chatroulette Map may be exposing itself to potential liability for infringement of privacy.

Chatroulette and Chatroulette Map Background
While users initiate a Chatroulette session from the Chatroulette website, the video session between the two users is a direct peer-to-peer connection between the two participants. This could be argued as a private (albeit randomly generated) communication between the two parties, akin to a telephone conversation or video chat. Chatroulette Map captures photos of participants and their IP addresses without their knowledge or consent, using the IP address information to approximately locate users on a worldwide map.

Privacy Infringement?
According to 18 § USC 2511, anyone who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication…shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years.” Under this code, the operators of Chatroulette Map are intentionally intercepting video feeds of each individual, capturing a screenshot and their IP address, and then making these publicly available on their site. This is a brand new tool, and we are still not clear how they are capturing the images & IP address. However, given that the video stream is a direct peer-to-peer connection between the Chatroulette users it is possible that Chatroulette Map operators stand in violation of 18 § USC 2511.

Additionally, Chatroulette Map itself might qualify as an electronic device (18 § USC 2512) in which the operators “know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications…”. While the classic definition of ‘device’ would lend itself to a physical device, it potentially applies to web-based tools as well. Devices don’t necessarily need to be limited to a piece of hardware, but software is capable of the same prohibitive functions identified in section 18 § USC 2512. In United States v. Spy Factory (1997), the court identified authority as crucial to the concept of surreptitious. Since Chatroulette users are not prompted, notified or otherwise aware of Chatroulettemap.com’s ability to capture their IP address and [a snapshot of] videostream. (18 § USC 2512)

According to the FTC Act, a trade practice is unfair if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers…”, based on this it’s not clear whether Chatroulette Map is actually violating this principle and causing substantial harm to the user. At most, the person’s photograph (screen capture) is tagged to their approximate location (based on an IP address reverse lookup), not currently revealing any other personal information about them. At first glance, it appears that that the user’s privacy is violated because they are using the Chatroulette program under the belief that their actions are anonymous. At no time during the use of the program is the user presented with a message asking them permission to disclose their location information.

The exposure of Chatroulette users’ approximate location might not qualify under the FTC’s definition of substantial harm (EPIC complaint to the FTC, 2008). There is no monetary harm involved to the user, nor are their any obvious harmful “unwarranted health and safety risks”. IP Address geolocation is approximate and typically does not reveal the exact location of the user. However, even though wiretapping may be conducted with no intent to purposely harm, the act of intercepting the communication surreptitiously itself might violate federal principles. (18 § USC 2512)

Chatroulette Map service borders on possible privacy infringement, though the question of substantial harm seems difficult to justify when considering United States v. Spy Factory and FTC v. Cyberspy Software. These cases made clear case for substantial harm. If Chatroulette Map were litigated against, the Courts would need to balance the surreptitious nature of the service against any substantial harm the service might cause.

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BONUS
Jon Stewart did a classic Daily Show sketch about Chatroulette:
http://www.mediaite.com/tv/daily-show-chatroulette-jon-stewart/

And the Oscar for Infringement Goes To . . .

After watching the Oscars last night, I found myself searching YouTube for Logorama, the winner of the Best Animated Short Film category. This French-made film packs what must be thousands of corporate logos into its 15 minutes, casting familiar characters from the Michelin Man to Mr. Peanut to Ronald McDonald in a crime caper. Truly everything in this film is a recognizable corporate symbol, from the distant landscape (Evian) to the stoplights (Stop N Go).

Now, this raises one huge question in my mind: Is this fair use? I can’t imagine the companies would have licensed their logos to anyone, much less a film like this (which is actually pretty filthy and profane). Granted, I don’t know anything about trademark law (as opposed to the thimble-full I now know about copyright), and the company in question here is French, so I’m not sure which laws would actually apply and how. My cursory search didn’t turn up anything about legal action against the film, though the Hollywood Reporter did note in a review that “it’s rather amazing that the film can be publicly shown at all without the threat of a lawsuit.”

But here’s the best wrinkle. Last night, immediately after the Oscars, a relatively good-quality version of the film was up on YouTube, split into two parts. The person who posted the videos added a note saying that all content was being posted under fair use. Well, sure enough, by today, any attempt to pull up those videos led to a notice that the clip “is no longer available due to a copyright claim” by production company Autour de Minuit.

For the moment, you can still see a less-clear version of at least the first half of the film here (though I claim no responsibility for any offense or trauma on your part due to language, violence, or the sheer weirdness of seeing the Pringles logo rendered as a leering old man).

My first instinct is that if this company is going to dish it out (in the form of using a bunch of corporate logos to make its art), it should also be able to take it (in the form of letting the clips stand on YouTube). But I’m curious to hear other thoughts.

Comment on Cardozo v. True case

While reading the Cardozo v. True case, I was surprised that the plaintiff (following the logic of her argument) decided to sue the bookstore where she bought the cookbook rather than the grocery store where she bought the Dasheen roots.  It seems more logical to me that a grocery store that regularly sells Dasheen roots could be expected to warn its customers about the physical properties of that product. Wouldn’t there be a better chance of winning an implied warranty case against the grocery store instead of the bookstore?

Of Liability and Responsibility (Or, Of Airplanes and Elephant Ears)

By Leah Anderson, Jackson Hull, Kimra McPherson, and Michael Porath

This week, we examine the extent to which information and the methods through which it is communicated to consumers expose information providers (such as authors, publishers, cartographers, and ISPs) to liability. We feel it is helpful to first evaluate liability exposure first along a spectrum — the axis of which measures the explicitness of the terms between information provider and consumer. We render it here from most to least explicit:

Terms Of Service –> Shrinkwrap License Agreements/Purchase Orders –> Implied Warranties –> Negligence –> Strict Product Liability

Fully explicit terms may be recorded as contractual obligations, such as in a TOS or terms attached to a purchase order. The terms are dictated by the provider; consumers are bound to the terms “whether they read them or not” (Mortenson, p. 4).  As indicated in Mortenson v. Timberline, attachments and subsequent modifications to preliminary terms are allowed under current licensing law. Consumers are bound to these new terms, often after simply continuing to use the product. Though the terms are explicit, the mechanics and timing of consumers’ agreement to them can vary: In Williams v. AOL, the court found the provider liable for damages because of AOL forced “subscribers [to] ‘agree’ to the TOS after configuration of the computer has been altered” (Williams, p. 2). Even with clearly stated terms, information providers can still incur liability.

Near the center of this spectrum lie implied agreements and liability for the “standard of care” expected by consumers. At issue with implied warranties is the extent to which a provider is liable for the information communicated to the consumer. In Cordoza v. True, the court distinguished “between the tangible properties of these goods and the thoughts and ideas conveyed thereby” (Cordoza, p. 2).  Here, the court provides immunity from liability to information providers who disseminate information without review. Any implied liability in that arrangement applies to the book or software itself, not the information it provides.

This immunity weakens as the provider claims status as a “professional” as or is generally perceived as such in the field. “When a person (or a firm) acts in a manner a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have recognized does not live up to a duty of care owed toward others” (Samuelson, p. 24), they may be guilty of negligence.  With respect to software, the information provided becomes more prescriptive, leaving the consumer out of the “judgment loop” (Samuelson, p. 26) and exposing the provider to claims of negligence.

On the far end of the spectrum are terms imposed by strict product liability. In this situation, the information itself may be cast as a product. When this claim is proven, the provider is “liable without fault” (Samuelson, p. 25) — meaning outside any contractual obligations with a consumer.  In Aetna v. Jeppesen, the chart manufacturer was held liable for its product’s inconsistent representation of information — a liability that extended to damages brought by parties with whom the provider had no formal or implied agreement, such as the families of the passengers.  Strict product liability may extend to any party involved in the dissemination of the information, its expected use, and any misuse of the information. It can also have an impact on how damages are awarded.

Producers v. Consumers: Who’s Responsible?

In discussing this spectrum thus far, we’ve been focusing mostly on the responsibility borne by a producer or distributor of information. But the consumer (or other user) of the information bears some responsibility as well.

For example, in Mortenson v. Timberline, the terms of service explicitly defined a “preferred method of conducting business” (Mortenson, p. 8). In agreeing to the terms, a consumer takes on a fair amount of responsibility for knowing what they actually say. (We, along with the judges of the majority opinion, question Mortenson’s behavior: An experienced consumer of software should expect that some terms are attached, rather than turn a blind eye if a box with no terms attached magically shows up.)

A customer’s responsibility can shift in cases where an implied warranty is concerned. Cardozo v. True doesn’t consider the liability of the author or publisher, only that of the seller; it’s possible the author could have been held liable for publishing incomplete information. But it could also be argued that the reader of the information isn’t exempt from common sense (i.e. “don’t put something in your mouth if you don’t know what it is”). Thus, we suspect liability in implied warranty cases would have to be weighed carefully against personal responsibility.

In the case of torts and strict product liability when no explicit contractual obligations are defined, the matter of personal responsibility becomes even more important: As Aetna v. Jeppesen demonstrates, a court can apportion the degree of fault between the customer (in this case, the airline and its pilots) and the provider of a service or good. The provider of the information needed to demonstrate some reasonable standard of care (though as some particularly pointed comments in the opinion state, so did the pilots).

A customer, in effect, cannot be completely exempt from acting responsibility in any case. However, the better-defined the contractual relationship, the more opportunity the producer has to explicitly shift responsibility to the consumer.

“12 Principles” and Consumer Awareness

With personal responsibility in mind, it’s interesting to look at the two digital cases  in particular through the lens of the propositions in Jean Braucher’s “New Basics: 12 Principles for Fair Commerce in Mass-Market Software and Other Digital Products.” Braucher argues for policy (and, ideally, federal legislation) that would clarify expectations for both producers and consumers in transactions of mass-market digital products: “We need some standardization of use rights if customers are to have any hope of knowing what they are” (p. 16).

Of the principles put together by Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions (p. 8), the following particularly apply to these cases:

I. Customers are entitled to readily find, review, and understand proposed terms when they shop.

II. Customers are entitled to actively accept proposed terms before they make the deal.

III. Customers are entitled to information about all known nontrivial defects in a product before coming to the deal.

V. Customers are entitled to have their disputes settled in a local convenient venue.

VI. Customers are entitled to control their own computer systems.

Facts that speak to principles II, V, and VI are clearly at play in Williams v. AOL: The subscribers’ computer systems were found to be altered in ways that the subscribers couldn’t control before they had the chance to actively accept the terms of service. Additionally, principle VI would suggest that forcing plaintiffs to travel to a specific court wouldn’t be a fair provision in a TOS agreement. In Mortenson v. Timberline, principle III is key: leaving aside the issue of who initiated the contract, the facts are clear that Timberline knew about a key defect in the software before the contract was enacted.

It’s notable that each of these 12 principles starts with “customers are entitled to . . .” — leaving a fair amount of responsibility in the customer’s hands to exercise those rights. Discussing principle I, Braucher notes: “Advance disclosure in the digital era is cheap, probably cheaper than getting terms onto disks or printed on pieces of paper and into boxes.” But customers have to take the next step of finding/reviewing/understanding. Would we do it? In discussing this post, the authors found that we’d virtually never read a TOS agreement all the way through (outside of class assignments, that is). In looking at the TOS for products that we regularly use, we learned some things that surprised us (Adobe Flash can’t be used on a tablet PC; PayPal users aren’t supposed to share other users’ information with anyone, a term that at least one group member has probably inadvertently violated.) Policy can encourage availability of information and fairness of terms, but customers will still bear some burden of due diligence and common sense.

Looking Towards the Future: Does Expanding Legislation Make Sense?

Common sense, of course, is a consistently evolving concept as well — especially as we’re asked to consider and evaluate more and more information. When Samuelson was surveying the information landscape in 1993, “Harry’s Medical Home Companion” may have been a futuristic fantasy. Today, websites employing this general concept are commonplace. Yet to many modern web users, the idea (suggested in Samuelson’s article) that any of today’s numerous non-professional websites could be held liable for the advice they provide seems laughable; not only would such litigation be impossible to control due to the sheer volume of unintelligent recommendations made on the Internet today, but it would also effectively eliminate any incentive for content providers to post any free and open content online out of fear of arousing a lawsuit.

In fact, many of the assumptions and discussions contained in this article seem horribly dated and irrelevant to us today, even though the article was written less than 20 years ago. For example, it is doubtful that the societal reverence to electronic information that may have once created an unwarranted sense of reliability will persist in a world of Wikipedia and gossip blogs. Also, because the vast majority of us no longer pay for Internet usage by the hour, taking time to browse through or examine online information products before purchase is no longer an issue of financial investment beyond that which we would incur in the non-cyber world.

This generates an important point: if all of the recommendations in Samuelson’s article or Braucher’s paper were somehow codified into law, how much of that law would remain applicable in field that changes so rapidly and unpredictably? Furthermore, how can we determine whether a law that was meant to protect freedom of expression on the Internet may later be applied to some new electronic medium in a way that unintentionally limits expression via this new medium based on the manner in which the law was designed or worded?

If we are working under the assumption that law should be designed to have some type of permanence, this line of argument would justify continued hesitance to reform laws related to the exchange of electronic information (contrary to the ideas that spawned the Braucher paper).  While we obviously cannot provide a clear resolution to this issue in one blog post, we would like to point out the notable absence of discussion of long-term applicability in the 12 principles. In a future study, it would be interesting to re-evaluate how challenging it would be to codify each of these “principles” without burdening the new laws with a cripplingly narrow scope or potentially hazardous future applications.

EFF’s “Practical Advice for Music Bloggers…”

In the wake of Blogger (Google’s) deletion of a number of music blogs last month, EFF‘s Fred von Lohmann blogged “Practical Advice for Music Bloggers Worried About DMCA Takedown Censorship.” It’s relevant to our discussion of DMCA safe harbors this week. While the DMCA explicitly permits response (counter-notice) to a takedown, because the next step for the copyright owner is to sue, von Lohmann advises “sending a counter-notice can have serious consequences if you’re not absolutely sure that you had all the necessary legal rights to post the songs or links in question. Sending a DMCA counter-notice is serious business, as it leaves the copyright owner with few options (other than suing) in order to keep the song down.”

The fact that the copyright owner’s next move, by law, is to sue definitely makes it seem like the system tips in favor of the copyright owner. Not all cases are like Lenz v. Universal, and DMCA takedowns are so effective because the receiver either doesn’t understand her/his rights or he/she understands but doesn’t want to risk a lawsuit. (The blogger could also have posted a track he/she knows is infringing, of course, but I’m more concerned with legal uses.) Each side is certainly in the position where it’s prudent to pick its battles wisely.