In examining the methods and historical contexts of espionage on the heels of our discussion of propaganda, it occurs to me that we are really looking at two sides of the same coin. Propaganda involves information manipulation by mass dissemination, while spying covers the flip side information manipulation by precisely targeted absorption. Espionage, as a kind of propaganda, work at interweaving the truth with fiction in order to achieve aims in accordance with the objectives of the spy, which is also the aim of propagandist. Both the extraction of information and the insertion (or, if you will, inception) of information require significant subterfuge at one level or another in order to with maximal effectiveness. This subterfuge may be more readily apparent as we turn to espionage.
From the very beginning of ‘The Use of Spies’, Sun Tzu establishes a clear connection between the lands, the harvest, and the power of the prince : if the prince cannot ensure the harvest, then he cannot be victorious on the battle field. Abandoned lands, lands without workers, are spreading anger and resentment, in the place where you fight as well as where you come from. Which leads us to another Chinese conception : the idea of politics as a management of flux : originally, the control over the 5 rivers of China was the pedestal of the prince power. The control of the rivers’ flow was equivalent to the control the irrigation as well as the downstream rate of flow. With such power, the prince was able to ensure not only the harvest and the social peace, but the intentions of its neighbors. There is in that extent a great divide between East and West on the conception of war craft: the Chinese war craft lies precisely in the shunning of frontal fight. War is the last resort, and the nobility in Sun Tzu’s war craft consists in avoiding the fighting in order to spare lives. This conception echoes with the martial arts, which are not based on brute force, but rather on following the opponent’s moves, to drag him down. Your opponent should not be blocked, but rather taken by surprise, to finally make him lose his balance.
Sun Tzu not only depicts the ‘enlightened general’ as prudent, cunning, pretending to be indifferent, but quick to strike at the heart of the enemy’s army. The general should spare all the lives he can, for the loss of men is inefficient during wartime. However, he should also be merciless (he even talks about ‘extermination’), for the death of traitors saves the lives of many.
In this context, Sun Tzu identifies five different classes of spies to be used by the general : local, inward, converted, doomed, and surviving. To him, the use of all of these spies in conjunction with one another is the best and most beneficial way of gaining an advantage over the enemy because it catches them by surprise. Spies are meant to remain unnoticed. A local spy works within a specified area that is familiar to them. An inward spy is like the mole, providing inside information from the enemy’s home ground. Converted spies are those that initially worked for the opposing side but switched sides. Doomed spies serve as a distraction to help gear the enemy’s attention in one direction. Surviving spies are those who successfully bring back information from the enemy. Once the enemy has been divided and weaken, the general should win the hearts and minds, to win without a fight.
Nothing, however, is absolute, and Sun Tzu’s laws of war are just patterns to be adapted to circumstances and opportunities during wartime. But then, when the ‘enlightened general’ starts to march, “the enemy is already defeated”.
This modern commentary on Sun Tzu’s chapter on intelligence tries to analyze what modern intelligence can learn from studying Sun Tzu’s treatise, a classic work in military history and strategy. Sun Tzu’s book, The Art of War (Sunzi bingfa). Although, “he [the author] is not modern, he is not Western, he is about as far from us in history as he can be” his work has been able to break language barriers (484). The translations into English have enabled people to learn about war, However, the translations have also presented problems as trying to grasp the meaning that Sun Tzu intended has been a challenge, especially in his chapter about espionage.
Because Chinese phrases are often hard to faithfully render into English, the term “The Divine Skein” has been translated in many different ways over the years since the initial French translation in the 18th century. Some interpretations include: “divine manipulation of the threads”, “spiritual methodology”, “secret service”, “divine organization”, “ spirit web” This term essentially describes a web of spies working for the ruler who provide the ruler/general with superior information on his adversary. Thus even during this pre-internet period, information was described using the metaphor of a web.
How to Realize Victory according to Sun Tzu…
“know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril” (487). Without a doubt, a great way to know the enemy is by using spies, the ones that are divided into five categories. Having spies is one of the aims, but having secrecy is the ultimate key to succeed. In fact the spies should be managed and given various levels of information based on their role in the “divine web”: native agents, inside agents, double agents, living agents, expendable agents.
This taxonomy suggests that information is something to be manipulated and used, evening amongst those working the same side, that the power of the person in charge of this web is based on his control of information and management to ensure that while each spy may know something, none is aware of the complete picture; that could lead to uprising or revolt. Information collection is seen as something that can help avoid war or reduce the costs. Traditional Chinese strategy places emphasis on setting up the situation so that the battle is won even before it is ever fought.
There are some problems to his perspective, as using spies does not guarantee victory. Though, his work demonstrates that espionage has been with us for a long time, at the same time that it offers useful information about war and its rhetoric. Information itself can be a weapon if managed properly and can actually be more powerful than blunt force. Also, in relation to concepts of technical determinism vs. social constructivism, the article shows that no matter how information technology has developed dramatically since the time of Sun Tzu, human calculation and instincts are still important in managing and analyzing whatever information is eventually obtained, either by ancient spies or by wiretapping and satellite imagery today.
Some of the methods and ideas under discussion by Sun Tzu and Warner in his analysis of the same come up in the example of diplomacy and espionage in John Hann’s “Cloak and Dagger in Apalachicole Province.”
To decipher “Cloak and Dagger in Apalachicole Province,” one must get some familiarity with countless names and name variants of the assorted provinces, towns, tribes, rivers and languages. Keeping the various political actors and their allegiances straight demonstrates the complex web of diplomacy and deception at play in a close study of a proxy conflict between two major European powers in the New World.
“Cloak and Dagger in Apalachicole Province” concentrates on the conflict between British and Spanish in Florida. The Spanish in Florida at the time had deep concerns about the expanding influence of British settlers to the North and utilized agents from various tribes in Northern Florida to gather intelligence and assist in the Spanish attempts to stem the tide of British commericial intrusion. The British countered with their own employment of natives for secret operations. But the increasingly violent, desperate tactics of the Spaniards eventually drove many of the tribes into the arms of the British.